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11

STATE OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)0) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. In determining whether the commercial user of tax-exempt property is in
"exclusive possession" of that property, and thus not entitled to an exemption from Utah's
privilege tax, must the district court consider the retained interest of the tax-exempt owner
of the property? (Addendum A, R. 1083-84.)
Standard of Review for Issue I: This issue presents a question of statutory
interpretation reviewed under a correctness standard, giving no deference to the legal
conclusions of the trial court. Abco Enter, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2009 UT 36, ^f 7,
211 P.3d 382 (analyzing Utah's privilege tax under uniform operation of laws provision
of the state constitution); R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Property and Cas. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n. 2008 UT 80, % 18, 199 P.3d 917.
II. Does Utah's privilege tax violate the Supremacy Clause by taxing the full
value of property that is used for commercial purposes by ATK, a non-exempt taxpayer,
but owned by the tax-exempt federal government? (Addendum A, R. 86-87.)
Standard of Review for Issue II: This issue presents a constitutional challenge to
Utah's privilege tax as applied under the Supremacy Clause. Whether the "statute is
constitutional is a question of law," that is "reviewed for correctness, giving no deference
to the trial court." Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, f 7, 67
-1-

P.3d 436. This Court presumes that "the legislation being challenged is constitutional"
and resolves "any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (West 2008)1
(l)(a) Except as provided in Subsections (l)(b) and (c), a tax is imposed on
the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or
personal property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that
property is used in connection with a business conducted for profit.

(2) The tax imposed under this chapter is the same amount that the ad
valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner of
the property. The amount of any payments which are made in lieu of taxes
is credited against the tax imposed on the beneficial use of property owned
by the federal government.
(3) A tax is not imposed under this chapter on the following:

(e) the use or possession of any lease, permit, or easement unless the
lease, permit, or easement entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive
possession of the premises to which the lease, permit, or easement relates.
Every lessee, permittee, or other holder of a right to remove or extract the
mineral covered by the holder's lease, right, permit, or easement except
from brines of the Great Salt Lake, is considered to be in possession of the
premises, notwithstanding the fact that other parties may have a similar
right to remove or extract another mineral from the same lands or estates.
(4) A tax imposed under this chapter is assessed to the possessors or users
of the property on the same forms, and collected and distributed at the same
time and in the same manner, as taxes assessed owners, possessors, or other
claimants of property which is subject to ad valorem property taxation. The
tax is not a lien against the property, and no tax-exempt property may be

1

The current language is identical to that in effect in 2000. See Utah Code Ann. §
59-4-101 (Supp. 2000).
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attached, encumbered, sold, or otherwise affected for the collection of the
tax.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court granting summary
judgment for Salt Lake County ("County") on its imposition of a privilege tax in 2000
and denying Alliant Techsystems, Inc.'s ("ATK") request for exemption of that tax or in
the alternative for a holding that the privilege tax violates the Supremacy Clause.
(Addendum A, R. 1089-1090).
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

This case arose from a privilege tax assessment by the County against ATK for its
commercial use of property owned by the Navy ("Government"). The case was heard in
a multiple day formal hearing at the Utah State Tax Commission. (R. 191-247.) Both
ATK and the County appealed that decision to the district court. In the district court, all
parties stipulated to settle the valuation issues and try the questions of exemption and
privilege tax to ATK's use of the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant. ("NIROP").
(R.l 19-128.) The County argued that it had properly assessed the tax based on ATK's
non-exempt use of NIROP. (R.75-107.) It further argued that Utah's privilege tax was
valid under the Supremacy Clause. Id. The Utah State Tax Commission argued that the
district court need not consider an exempt entity's retained interest and further argued that
Utah's privilege tax is valid under the Supremacy Clause by assessing the tax using at the
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full value of the property used for a commercial purpose. (R.850-860.) ATK argued that
it was entitled to an exemption because the federal government's retained interest did not
give it exclusive use of the property. This case was resolved below when the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the County's assessment of a privilege tax
against ATK's commercial use of the Government's NIROP facility and denied ATK's
request for exemption. The court declined to hold the privilege tax unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause. (R.1079-1088.) ATK brought this appeal. (R.1093.)
C.

Statement of Facts

The district court adopted undisputed facts asserted by the parties. (R. 1081.) Salt
Lake County ("County") assessed a privilege tax (which assesses a tax on a nonexempt
entity's commercial use of exempt property) against Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK")
for its use of the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant ("NIROP") that is owned by
the United States Navy ("Government"). (R. 1080.) The district court found that ATK's
contractual use of the Government's property was "a permit." (R. 1082-83.)
The Government has granted ATK use of the property under a "facilities use
agreement." (R. 1080.) ATK uses NIROP to manufacture missile rocket motors for the
Navy and for other projects such as those for the United States Army Space & Missile
Defense Command. (R. 80, *| 17.) However, by contract ATK gives first priority to
manufacturing for the Navy. (R. 750, f 8.) No other private company may use NIROP
nor does any other entity have a contract allowing it to use NIROP. (R. 1080.) ATK did
not present evidence that anyone other than the Government had "any possession, use,
-4-

management, or control of the NIROP Property during 2000." (R. 1084.)
The NIROP property consists of 528 acres with 181 improvements. (R. 1080.)
Fifteen of these improvements were vacant, while ATK u^ed 165 of them in its
operations, and the Navy used one for maintenance and oyersight of ATK. (Id.) The
district court found that "much of the management and control exercised by the Navy on
the NIROP Property was ancillary to ATK's operations and, therefore, beneficial to
ATK." (R. 1084.) The district court also found that the "County did not assess a
privilege tax against the unused buildings as they were found to have no value." (R.
1087.) The court concluded that ATK was not entitled to m exemption under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e) because it was in exclusive possession of the NIROP property. It
further concluded that ATK lacked standing to argue a Supremacy Clause violation, but
even if ATK had standing, the County's assessment of ATK based on the value of the
property used by ATK did not violate the Constitution.
On appeal this Court must decide whether ATK is entitled to an exemption for lack
of "exclusive possession" of NIROP because of the Government's retained interest. It
must also decide whether ATK had standing to raise a clainii that Utah's privilege tax
violates the Supremacy Clause,2 and if so, whether an assessment on the full value of
Property used for commercial purposes by ATK violates th^ Supremacy Clause.

2

The Tax Commission has not taken a position on AjTK's standing.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah law squarely places the burden on ATK to show its legal and factual
entitlement to an exemption under Utah's privilege tax. The exemption ATK claimed
provides that a "tax is not imposed under this chapter on the following . . . the use or
possession of any lease, permit, or easement unless the lease, permit, or easement entitles
the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the premises to which the lease, permit,
or easement relates." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3) (e) (West 2008).3 ATK's argument
is unworkable. ATK would include the exempt entities' interest in deciding whether
there is "exclusive possession." The exempt entity always retains an interest in the
property. The privilege tax would be inoperable under ATK's theory.
If this Court concludes that ATK has standing to make its Supremacy Clause
argument, it should sustain the holding of the district court that Utah's privilege tax does
not contravene the Supremacy Clause. (R. 1086.) The privilege tax is measured as
though the "possessor or user were the owner of the property." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4101(2) (West 2008). Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that
a state may measure a tax by the full value of the Government's property as long as it
does not directly tax the Government's property. The cases cited by ATK do not support
a contrary result.

3

The current language is identical to that in effect in 2000. See Utah Code Ann. §
59-4-101 (Supp. 2000).
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ARGUMENT
Introduction
Utah law imposes a privilege tax on "the possession or other beneficial use" by
any person of otherwise exempt property. Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(l)(a) (West
2008).4 The statute also exempts the "use or possession" of a "lease, permit, or easement"
unless the "lessee or permittee" is "in exclusive possession of the premises" to which the
"lease, permit, or easement relates." Id at § 59-4-101(3)(e). ATK argues that it does not
have exclusive possession because of the retained interests of the federal government.
This argument fails because the privilege tax would be inoperable. The exempt owner
always has a retained interest. ATK is subject to the privilege tax for using exempt
Government property in its commercial manufacturing business.
ATK additionally argues that the privilege tax violates the Supremacy Clause
because it measures the tax by the full value of the property without apportioning out the
Government's interest. Both the Utah and United States Supreme Courts have sustained
the full value of the exempt property used for a commercial purpose as an appropriate
way to determine the amount of the tax.

4

The current language is identical to that in effect in 2000. See Utah Code Ann. §
59-4-101 (Supp. 2000).
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I.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RETAINED INTEREST IN TAXEXEMPT PROPERTY DOES NOT DEPRIVE ATK OF
"EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION" OF THAT PROPERTY FOR
PURPOSES OF THE PRIVILEGE TAX EXEMPTION IN UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-4-101(3)(e).

This Court should sustain the district court's holding that ATK is not entitled to an
exemption for lack of "exclusive possession" of NIROP due to the exempt retained
interest of the Government. (R. 1084.) The district court reasoned that "[b]y their very
definition and operation, a lease, a permit, and an easement transfer less than the full
bundle of rights held by the landowner." (R. 1083.) In addition, "[t]he language of the
statute contemplates that a person may have exclusive possession under a lease, a permit,
or an easement." (R. 1083.) Further, said the court, "exclusive possession" under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e) excludes "management and control by the land owner,"
otherwise "the privilege tax could only be assessed against a landowner in fee-simple"
which would make the statute "unreasonably confused and inoperable." (R. 1084
(citation omitted).) Alternatively, the district court reasoned, the Navy's involvement at
the property was "ancillary to ATK's operations and therefore, beneficial to ATK." (R.
1084.)
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court does "not defer to the legal
conclusions of the district court, but reviewfs] them for correctness." Gardner v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs of Wasatch County. 2008 UT 6, % 17, 178 P.3d 893 (quoting Springville
Citizens for a Better Cmtv. v. City of Sprineville, 1999 UT 25, f 22). ATK bears the
burden of showing that it was entitled to summary judgment on its exemption request.
-8-

Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, f 10 (stating that if the moving party bears the burden at
trial, it must establish each element of its claim in order to I show entitlement to summary
judgment).
Utah law squarely places the burden on ATK to show its legal and factual
entitlement to the exemption:
First, we construe statutes that grant exclusions from taxation strictly against
the party seeking an exemption, and that party accordingly bears the burden
of proving that it qualifies for the exemption. Second, in construing any
statute, "'we first examine the statute's plain language and resort to other
methods of statutory interpretation only if the language is ambiguous.'"
Accordingly, we read the words of a statute literally unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable . .. and give the words their usual and
accepted meaning. Third, the reviewing court does not look beyond plain
and unambiguous language to ascertain legislative intent. Finally, we
presume that the "statute is valid and that the words [and phrases used were
chosen carefully and advisedly."
US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1111-18 (Utah App. 1994)
(summarizing decisions governing interpretation of tax exemptions) (citations omitted).
The district court correctly interpreted the exemption statute. Under Utah law, all
property is subject to taxation unless constitutionally exempt. Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2.
Utah's privilege tax was enacted to "'close any gaps in the tax laws' between those who
possess or use exempt property for a profit and those who possess or use nonexempt
property for profit." Abco Enterprises v. Utah State Tax Cfonm'm 2009 UT 36, If 23, 211
P.3d 382 (quoting Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chem. Corp., v. State Tax Comm'n, 573
P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977) (analyzing Utah's privilege tax Under uniform operation of
laws provision of the state constitution)).
-9-

As stated in the privilege tax statute, a tax is imposed "on the possession or other
beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or personal property which for any reason
is exempt from taxation, if that property is used in connection with a business for profit."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(l)(a) (emphasis added). The tax is "assessed to the
possessors or users of the property" and does not create "a lien against the property." Id
at § 59-4-101(4). It is imposed on the non-exempt possessor or user at "the same amount"
as "if the possessor or user were the owner of the property." Id at § 59-4-101(2). Further,
under the privilege tax, no "tax-exempt property may be attached, encumbered, sold, or
otherwise affected for the collection of the tax." I d at § 59-4-101(4).
ATK is subject to a privilege tax absent an exemption. NIROP is an exempt
property owned by the Government. (R. 1082.) ATK uses NIROP in its profit making
business, (id.), which the district court held gave ATK a permit. (R. 1082-83.) Other than
ATK, no private entity used NIROP for any purpose nor did any other entity have a
facilities use contract like ATK. (R. 1080.)
A specific list of privilege tax exemptions is contained in the privilege tax statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3). The exemption at issue here is found in section 59-4101(3)(e), which provides that a "tax is not imposed under this chapter on the following ..
the use or possession of any lease, permit, or easement unless the lease, permit, or
easement entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the premises to which
the lease, permit, or easement relates." I d at § 59-4-101(3) (e).
The district court concluded, and ATK does not now challenge, "that the facilities
-10-

use agreement is a permit." (R. 1083.) The district court rfelied on Black's Law
Dictionary to hold that a permit and license are synonymous. (R. 1028.) This Court has
stated that a license
is the permission or authority to engage in a particular act or series of acts
upon the land of another without possessing an interest therein/ 25
Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 137 (1996), and is 'subject to the
management and control retained by the owner.' 49 IAm.Jur.2d Landlord and
Tenant §21 (1996).
Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion. Inc.. 959 P.2H 102, 107 (Utah 1998)
(emphasis added). This Court's definition of license excludes the interests of the property
owner. This same exclusion of the interests "retained by the owner" was relied on by the
district court below in construing the statutory language "exclusive possession" to hold
that the retained interests of the Government need not be considered in determining
whether ATK qualified for an exemption. (R. 1084.)
The exemption does not make sense if the retained iiiterest of the exempt owner
negates any "exclusive possession" by the holder of a lease?i permit, or easement. The
privilege tax is assessed based on "the possession or other beneficial use" of the property
"used in connection with a business for profit." That is the possession the Court should
examine in construing "exclusive possession." The district tourt correctly interpreted the
exemption statute.
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II.

UTAH'S PRIVILEGE TAX, ASSESSED ON THE FULL VALUE OF
PROPERTY USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES BY ATK,
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE BY TAXING
THE UNITED STATES.

If this Court finds that ATK had standing, it should sustain the holding of the
district court that Utah's privilege tax satisfies the Supremacy Clause.5 (R. 1086.) The
privilege tax is measured as though the "possessor or user were the owner of the property."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(2) (West 2008). The district court correctly relied on United
States Supreme Court precedent to sustain the tax on ATK. Likewise, the United States
Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that a state may measure a tax by the full
value of the Government's property as long as it does not directly tax the Government's
property. Utah case law is the same. Despite the case law, ATK's argument is that
"[t]here is no mechanism within the statute to reduce the privilege tax to reflect the value
of the user's interest." (Appellant's Br. at 35.)
A,

The District Court Correctly Relied on United States v. New
Mexico to Sustain the Privilege Tax.

The district court below, relying on United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720
(1982), held that "ATK had 'exclusive possession5 of NIROP. Further, if ATK's
possession of the NIROP Property was exclusive, its beneficial use of the NIROP Property
was the value of the NIROP Property and there was no tax assessed against the Navy."
(R.1086.) The Court went on to further hold that apportionment was unnecessary because

5

The Tax Commission has not taken a position on the issue of ATK's standing.
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ATK exclusively possessed and/or beneficially used all but 15 of the
improvements on the NIROP Property. Salt Lake County did not assess a
privilege tax against the unused buildings as they were found to have no
value. Accordingly, Salt Lake County only assessed a privilege tax against
ATK for the actual possession and the actual other beneficial use ATK
enjoyed on the NIROP Property.
(R. 1086-87.) The district court was correct.
The doctrine of tax immunity is found in New Mexico. The basic principle is that
"a State may not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, lay a
tax 'directly upon the United States."' Id. at 733 (announcing a return to this underlying
constitutional principle) (quoting Mayo v. United States. 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943)). The
Court's analysis relies heavily on the word "directly."
The rule announced by the Court in New Mexico is that "tax immunity is
appropriate in only one circumstance: when the levy falls on the United States itself, or on
an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot
realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity being taxed is
concerned." 455 U.S. at 735. Federal tax "immunity may not be conferred simply
because the tax has an effect on the United States, or even because the Federal
Government shoulders the entire economic burden of the levy." Id at 734. Moreover, "to
resist the State's taxing power, a private taxpayer must actually 'stand in the
Government's shoes.'" Id at 736 (quoting City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.. 355 U.S. 489,
503 (1953)). Only Congress may expand this doctrine "beyond its narrow constitutional
limits," and absent Congressional action "the States' power to tax can be denied only
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under 'the clearest constitutional mandate.'" IcL at 738 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages. 423 U.S. 276, 293 (1976)).
The rule announced by the Court relies on the principle of federalism to forestall
the problem of "clashing sovereignty" that was first announced in McCulloch v. Maryland.
4 Wheat.316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) (announcing doctrine of federal immunity from state
taxation), while "giving full range to each sovereign's taxing authority." New Mexico. 455
U.S. at 735-36.6 Granting immunity to entities that are "incorporated into the government
structure" forestalls "some of the manipulation and wooden formalism that occasionally
have marked tax litigation - and that have no proper place in determining the allocation of
power between coexisting sovereignties." IdL at 737.
New Mexico sharply contrasted the contractor's possession or use of property to
that of the property owned by the Government. This is because "the contractor's use of
the property 'in connection with commercial activities carried on for profit' is ca separate
and distinct taxable activity.'" IcL at 734-35 (quoting United States v. Boyd. 378 U.S. 39,
44 (1964)). The tax on the use of property is "valid only to the extent that it reaches the

6

"McCulloch foresaw the unfairness in forcing a state to exempt private
individuals with beneficial interests in federal property from taxes imposed on similar
interests held by others in private property." United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S.
452, 463 (1977). Utah's privilege tax was enacted to "'close any gaps in the tax laws'
between those who possess or use exempt property for a profit and those who possess or
use nonexempt property for profit." Abco Enterprises v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2009
UT 36, f 23; 211 P.3d 382 (quoting Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977)(analyzing Utah's privilege tax under uniform
operation of laws provision of the state constitution)).
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contractor's interest in Government-owned property . . . . " Id at 741 n.14.
The decision below complies with all of the requirements of New Mexico. First,
the imposition of the tax does not fall "on the United States itself." The district court
found that the County had only "assessed a privilege tax against ATK for the actual
possession and the actual other beneficial use ATK enjoyed on the NIROP Property."
(R.1087 (footnotes omitted).) There has been no showing by ATK that the County
attempted to assess a privilege tax against the Government.
Second, ATK has failed to establish that it was an "agency or instrumentality so
closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as
separate entities, at least insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned." As the district
court found and the parties agreed below, "ATK used the NIROP Property in connection
with a business conducted for profit." (R.1082.) Accordingly, under New Mexico, this
use of the property for ATK's own commercial business makes its use a separate taxable
activity. 455 U.S. at 735.
Finally, under New Mexico, the tax assessed by the County does not go beyond
ATK's use or possession. The property was used by ATK "on a rent-free non-interference
basis" pursuant to ATK's contract. (R.1080.) No other entity used the property for any
purpose, nor did any entity hold a facilities use contract allowing it to use the property.
(Id.) The NIROP property consists of 528 acres with 181 improvements. (Id.) Fifteen of
these improvements were vacant, while ATK used 165 of them in its operations, and the
Navy used one for maintenance and oversight of ATK. (Id.) The district court found that
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"much of the management and control exercised by the Navy on the NIROP Property was
ancillary to ATK's operations and, therefore, beneficial to ATK." (R.1084.) The district
court found that the "County did not assess a privilege tax against the unused buildings as
they were found to have no value." (R.1087.)
This Court should hold that the district court did not err in its application of New
Mexico.
B.

The United States Supreme Court Has Held Valid a Tax
Measured by the Value of Government Owned Property.

The tax measure under Utah's privilege tax complies with the Supremacy Clause
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Utah's privilege tax is measured "at the
same amount that the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the
owner of the property." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(2). The value of the property is a
proper measure of the tax.
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S.
452 (1977) stated that the
rule to be derived from the Court's more recent decisions, then, is that the
economic burden on a federal function of a state tax imposed on those who
deal with the Federal Government does not render the tax unconstitutional so
long as the tax is imposed equally on the other similarly situated constituents
of the State.
429 U.S. at 462. The Court explained that this was the Court's long established principle
since the late 1930fs.
The Court said that the one exception to the long established case law found in City
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of Fresno was arguably its decision in United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174
(1944). In City of Fresno, the Court said in a footnote, "[ijnsofar as United States v.
Allegheny County, supra, holds that a tax measured by the value of Government-owned
property may never be imposed on a private party who is using it, that decision has been
overruled by United States v. City of Detroit... and its companion cases." 429 U.S. at
464 n.10 (emphasis added).
In addition to Fresno, City of Detroit and "its companion cases" make plain the
validity of the mechanism used by Utah to measure its privilege tax. First, in United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), Borg-Warner Corporation leased a portion
of an industrial plant from the United States. "The tax was based on the value of the
property leased and computed at the rate used for calculating real property taxes." IcL at
476 (emphasis added). The Court sustained the tax as permissible and stated that in
"measuring such a use tax it seems neither irregular nor extravagant to resort to the value
of the property used . . . . " Id. at 470 (emphasis added). Further, stated the Court, "it
seems obvious enough that use of exempt property is worth as much as use of comparable
taxed property during the same interval." Id.
Second, in United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958),
Continental Motors Corporation was granted a permit to a manufacturing plant owned by
the United States. The tax "was measured by the value of the exempt property which it
was then using." IcL at 485 (emphasis added). The Court sustained the tax as permissible
because "Continental was using the property in connection with its own commercial
-17-

activities." I d at 486.
Third, in City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489, 491 (1958),
Murray Corporation was assessed a tax "based on the value of materials and work in
process in its possession to which the United States held legal title under the title-vesting
provisions of the subcontract." (emphasis added). The Court sustained the tax as identical
to that in the other two cases. Id. at 461.
Utah's privilege tax on the value of the property used by the nonexempt entity is
consistent with each of these cases. This Court should sustain the district court's holding
that Utah's privilege tax measure does not violate the Supremacy Clause.
C,

This Court's Decision in Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson
States the Correct Principles of Federal Law that Govern this
Case.

The Utah Supreme Court in Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391
(Utah 1964), sustained Utah's privilege tax against a Supremacy Clause challenge. Utah's
privilege tax was patterned after the Michigan tax that had been challenged in City of
Detroit, Township of Muskegon, and Murray Corp. of America. Id. at 394 n.4. While
Thiokol predates the governing federal precedents of New Mexico and City of Fresno by
almost two decades, it relies on many of the same cases supporting them.
In Thiokol this Court adopted the "legal incidence" test: "that if the tax is directly
upon the United States or an agency thereof, it is invalid." 393 P.2d at 393. However,
where "the tax falls upon another, the fact that the tax might indirectly fall upon the United
States does not render it invalid." Id. This is "grounded on the proposition that a private
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contractor's right to use property in a business for profit may be made subject to a
nondiscriminatory tax based on its value, even though the title to the property may be in
the United States and that the burden of the tax may ultimately fall on it." Id. at 394
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Thiokol like City of Fresno, relies on City of
Detroit and its two companion cases, Township of Muskegon and Murray Corp. of
America. Thiokol is a correct statement of the law that is consistent with New Mexico and
City of Fresno.
D.

ATK Incorrectly Argues that Utah's Law Violates the Supremacy
Clause As Applied to a Contractor Using Federal Property.

ATK has not set forth the governing principles of New Mexico and City of Fresno
nor does it reconcile the facts of this case with those requirements. Instead, ATK argues
that "[tjhere is no mechanism within the statute to reduce the privilege tax to reflect the
value of the user's interest." Appellant's Br. at 35. It then relies on numerous cases in
support of its argument. None of those cases supports ATK's position.
ATK relies on United States v. Colorado. 460 F. Supp. 1184 (D.C. Colo. 1978),
affd, 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980), aff d sub nom., Jefferson County v. United States.
450 U.S. 901 (1981), and particularly focuses on the federal district court decision in that
case. The district court did not reach the question raised by ATK here. It reviewed the
Allegheny decision, that was discussed in City of Fresno above, in which Allegheny had
been expressly overruled. The Colorado district court stated that as far as Allegheny
stands for the proposition that use of government property by "a private citizen may not be
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taxed at its full value where contractual restrictions on its use for the Government's benefit
render the property less valuable to the user, the case has no application here." 460 F.
Supp. at 1189 (emphasis added).
Likewise, on appeal from the district court, the Tenth Circuit in Colorado did not
restate or adopt the federal district court's reasoning. United States v. Colorado, 627 F.2d
217 (10th Cir. 1980). The Tenth Circuit held that Rockwell was not subject to taxation for
"merely going onto government owned property where it performs its management
services." IdL at 220. Rockwell did not have "any lease, permit or license to the property."
IcL at 218-19. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Rockwell's situation from cases involving
use of government property to produce goods which are later sold for a profit as had been
the case in Township of Muskegon and City of Detroit.

Id. Colorado does not support

ATK's position.
Further, ATK incorrectly relies on decisions from the Ninth and Sixth Circuits.
ATK relies on United States v. Nve County. Nevada. 938 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nye
I), as holding that a possessory or use tax like Utah's privilege tax is invalid. Appellant's
Br. at 35. However, the Nye I court found that the offending Nevada tax was "an ad
valorem tax," on the government property itself. Id. at 1041. It stated that although "Nye
County could no doubt enact a statute taxing a lessee's possessory interest in, or a user's
beneficial use of property owned by the United States, the statute under which it levied
taxes against Areata is not such a tax measure." Id. at 1043. The offending Nevada statute
provided that "[p]ersonal property exempt from taxation which is leased, loaned or
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otherwise made available to and used by a natural person . . . for profit is subject to
taxation in the same amount and to the same extent as though the lessee or user were the
owner of the property

" Idu at 1042. Accordingly, the offending Nevada tax was on

the government's property itself, not the beneficial use of the property by the contractor.
That tax, which is unlike Utah's privilege tax, was held invalid because of its imposition,
not its tax measurement mechanism.
Citing a second Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. Nye County, Nevada, 178
F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999) (Nye II), that examined the revised Nevada tax from Nye I, ATK
argues that Nye II stands for the proposition that a revised privilege tax was upheld on the
beneficial use of the property rather than the full value of the property. Appellant's Br. at
36. Like Utah's statute, Nevada had "shifted the subject of the taxes from the property
itself to the beneficial use of that property." Id. at 1085. The Ninth Circuit found that the
new tax was imposed correctly. Id.
However, the Nye II court never reached the question of how the tax must be
measured. It stated that "[m]uch case law suggests that the tax on the use of federal
property may be measured by the value of the property itself." Id. at 1086 (emphasis
added). Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit cited two United States Supreme Court cases but
ignored them both. It then referenced a decision of the Sixth Circuit requiring a
determination of the contractor's use and cited from a footnote in New Mexico, discussed
above, requiring that the tax not exceed the contractor's interest in government property.
Id. The Nye II court then stated that "[wjhether or not there needs to be a valuation limit,
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Nevada's revised statutes already provide one . . . " Id Accordingly, the court never
analyzed the question or stated the proposition argued by ATK, i.e., that the full value of
the property must be apportioned between the Government and the contractor.
The Sixth Circuit opinion referred to by the Ninth Circuit in Nye II and argued by
ATK here likewise never addresses ATK's proposition. The Sixth Circuit in United States
v. Hawkins, 859 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988), invalidated Tennessee's attempts to impose a tax
that it described as "an ad valorem tax on an interest in real property." Id. at 23 ("[a]ll
property of the United States . . . leased or otherwise used . . . shall be assessed to such
user . . . ."). The Hawkins court concluded that "[wjhether or not the Tennessee legislature
had in mind a tax on beneficial use, it unquestionably did not describe one when it enacted
the statute in question." IcL at 24. The Tennessee tax was invalidated on its imposition of
a tax on government property, not on the tax's measurement mechanism. Utah's privilege
tax is imposed on the beneficial use of the Government's property, not on the property
itself.
This Court should reject ATK's invitation to require apportionment of the full value
of the property between the Government and the contractor when measuring Utah's
privilege tax. None of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court require it, nor is it
generally recognized as a correct statement of the law.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that the district court did not err in interpreting "exclusive
possession" for the exemption found in Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(e) to exclude
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consideration of the retained interest of the exempt entity. If the Court sustains the district
court's ruling on standing, this Court should also hold that Utah's method of calculating
the privilege tax comports with the decisions of the Utah and United States Supreme
Courts by measuring the privilege tax as though the nonexempt user owned it.
DATED this \^~ day of July, 2010.

JOHN C. McCARREY
sistant Attorney General
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Case No. 030917933 (Third District Court
case number)
Judge Jon M. Memmott

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The
Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting
documentation, and the Court's case file. The Court also held a hearing on October 26,2009.
Having considered all of the arguments, and being fully advised as to the premises, and for the
reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES the Petitioner's motion and GRANTS the
Respondents' motion.
BACKGROUND
In the year 2000, Petitioner, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK"), manufactured missile
rocket motors for private companies who, ultimately, provided tliese missile rocket motors to the
United States Navy. ATK used property known as the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant
(the "NIROP Property") to produce these missile rocket motors. The NIROP Property was

comprised of six (6) parcels constituting approximately 528.48 acres of land and 181
improvements. The United States Navy (the "Navy") owned the NIROP Property and ATK used
the NIROP Property under a facilities use agreement. This contract allowed ATK to use the
NIROP Property on a rent-free non-interference basis. No other private company used the
NIROP Property for any purpose and no other entity had a facilities use contract permitting use
of the NIROP Property. However, the Navy had one (1) building and maintained fourteen (14)
employees to manage the NIROP Property and inspect ATK's operations.
Of the 181 improvements on the NIROP Property, ATK used 165 in connection with its
operations, the Navy used 1 for maintenance of the NIROP Property and oversight of ATK and
its operations, and 15 were vacant.
In 2000, Salt Lake County assessed ATK a privilege tax against the NIROP Property,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101, based on the value of the property possessed or
beneficially used by ATK. The Salt Lake County assessor determined that 144 of the
improvements contributed 99.7% of the value of the NIROP Property, and that 15 of the
improvements contributed no value.
ATK has exhausted all of its administrative remedies through the Utah State Tax
Commission and comes to the Court seeking relief from the assessed privilege tax imposed under
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 based on an exemption found in subsection 3(e) of the statute. ATK
argues that the Navy's retained control of the NIROP Property resulted in ATK having less than
"exclusive possession." ATK also argues that assessing a privilege tax according to the full value
of the property was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution as a
tax on the federal government's retained interest in the NIROP Property.
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Respondents argue that ATK was subject to the privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. §594-101. Respondents argue that ATK did not qualify for the exception to the tax contained within
subsection 3(e) because ATK did not have a lease, permit, or easement from the Navy and/or
because ATK had exclusive possession of the NIROP Property.
Following a telephone conference on issues before this court,1 a complete briefing of the
parties' cross motions, and at the conclusion of the October 26,2009 hearing, the Court took the
matter under advisement. Accordingly, the cross motions are now ripe for determination.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate only when, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Here, the parties acknowledged at the October 26,2009 hearing that the relevant material
facts to the parties' motions for summary judgment are not disputed. The court will therefore
adopt the factual assertions of the parties' pleadings as its findings in this case. (See Petitioner's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Respondents' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.). Accordingly, the Court shall make its
determination on the parties' motions for summary judgment as a matter of law. Two issues are
presented for the Court's determination.
1

According to the strict reading of the parties' Settlement Agreement dated October 1,2007, the parties were only
to litigate the issue of whether ATK can claim an exemption to the privilege tax. (See Joint Motion for Entry of
Order Resolving All Valuation Claims and for Stay Pending Transfer and Reassignment for Further Proceedings).
During the September 11,2009 telephone conference with the parties, the Court inquired whether the Settlement
Agreement barred ATK's Supremacy Clause argument. Following the telephone conference, however, the parties
informed the Court of their stipulation and agreement that the Settlement Agreement does not bar ATK from raising
its Supremacy Clause argument with the Court. Accordingly, this Ruling will address both of the issues raised by
ATK.
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I. Can ATK claim an exemption to the privilege tax assessed under Utah Code Section 594-101?
"[A] tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person of
any real or personal property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property is
used in connection with a business conducted for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(l)(a)
(emphasis added). However, a tax is not imposed on "the use or possession of any lease, permit,
or easement unless the lease, permit, or easement entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive
possession of the premises to which the lease, permit, or easement relates." Utah Code Ann. §
59-4-101(3)(e) (emphasis added).
It is not disputed that the NIROP Property was exempt from state property taxation
because it was owned by the federal government See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(3)(a).
Further, it is undisputed that ATK used the NIROP Property in connection with a business
conducted for profit. Accordingly, the only remaining issues in this matter are: A) Did ATK have
a permit2 entitling it to use or possession of the NIROP Property; and B) Did ATK have
exclusive possession of the NIROP Property?
A. Did ATK have a permit to use the NIROP Property?
According to Blacks Law Dictionary, the terms "permit" and "license" are synonymous
and a "license" is defined as "[a] revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise
be unlawful

" Black's Law Dictionary 418, 524 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). Pursuant to ATK's

facilities use agreement, ATK had permission to occupy and use the NIROP Property, something
that would otherwise be illegal (as a trespass) absent the Navy's permission. When asked at the
October 26,2009 hearing what ATK had, if not a lease, a permit, or an easement, Respondents'

2

Respondents argue that ATK did not have a lease, permit, or an easement ATK argues that it had a permit. There
is not contention that ATK had a lease or easement with regard to the NIROP Property.
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were without an answer and readily admitted their argument that ATK did not have a permit was
"weak." The Court agrees and, accordingly, finds that the facilities use agreement is a permit.
B. Did ATK have exclusive possession of the NIROP Property?
Whether ATK had exclusive possession of the NIROP Property "is a matter of statutory
construction and therefore is a conclusion of law." Gull Labs., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.,
936 P.2d 1082,1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This Court is to "construe statutes that grant
exclusions from taxation strictly against the party seeking an exemption, and that party,
accordingly, bears the burden of proving that it qualifies for the exemption sought," Id.
(quotations omitted). See also. Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n. of Utah. 573 P.2d 337,340 (Utah 1977) ("Exemptions from taxation are to be strictly
construed and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of taxation."). Further, this Court will
"read the words of a statute literally unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable . . . [and] presume that the statute is valid and that the words and phrases used were
chosen carefully and advisedly/' Gull Labs., Inc., 936 P.2d at 1084 (quotations omitted).
ATK argues it did not have exclusive possession of the NIROP Property because the
Navy retained some amount of management and control of the NIROP Property. ATK relies on
Keller v. Southwood North Medical Plaza, Inc. to argue that a lease transfers exclusive
possession but that a permit does not. 959 P.2d 102,107 (Utah 1998). While this interpretation
may be appropriate for forcible entry actions, such as in Keller, this interpretation would render
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 non-sensical By their very definition and operation,
a lease, a permit, and an easement transfer less than the full bundle of rights held by the
landowner. Additionally, the language of the statute contemplates that a person may have
exclusive possession under a lease, a permit, or an easement. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-4Page 5

101(3)(e). If, as ATK argues, the statute's use of exclusive possession excepted the retention of
management and control by the landowner (i.e. the Navy), the privilege tax could only be
assessed against a landowner in fee-simple. Such a reading is "unreasonably confused and
inoperable," because the landowner in fee simple, the Navy, is exempt from property taxes under
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(3)(a). Gull Labs., Inc., 936 P.2d at 1084 (quotations omitted).
Moreover, in this matter, much of the management and control exercised by the Navy on
the NIROP Property was ancillary to ATK's operations and, therefore, beneficial to ATK. Cf
Loyal Order of Moose v. County Bd. Of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d257,261-63
(Utah 1982). For example, the Navy used their office at ATK's administration building in Plant
One to provide technical assistance to ATK in their fulfillment of Navy contracts. Additionally,
the fourteen (14) Navy personnel were on site to manage the NIROP Property and assist ATK in
the fulfillment of Navy contracts.
Accordingly, because the Court is to interpret taxation statutes strictly against ATK, and
since there is a presumption that the statute is valid, the Court concludes that ATK was in
exclusive possession of its permit, as contemplated in Utah Code Section 59-4-101 (3)(e), even
though the land-owner, the Navy, retained traditional levels of management and control in the
NIROP Property. ATK has presented no evidence or argument that anyone other than the Navy,
the land-owner, had any possession, use, management, or control of the NIROP Property during
2000. Accordingly, the Court finds that ATK has not met its burden and is not able to avoid the
privilege tax assessed under Utah Code Section 59-4-101.
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IL Is the tax imposed under Utah Code Section 59-4-101 a violation of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution?
ATK argues that the privilege tax Salt Lake County assessed against ATK was a violation
of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because such tax was based on the
full value of the NIROP Property and was not apportioned for the management and control
retained by the Navy. See U.S. Const, art. VI, § 2. However, the Court finds that ATK does not
have standing to raise this issue on behalf of the United States government.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution creates rights for the federal
government, not for private individuals. Id. In Shelledv v, Lore% the Utah Supreme Court
established a three-part test to determine when a party may assert the constitutional rights of a
third party. 836 P.2d 786,789 (Utah 1992). Under this test, the following factors must be
established:
First, the presence of some substantial relationship between the claimant
and the third parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders asserting
their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of
third parties' constitutional rights that would result were the assertion of jus
tertii not permitted.
H«
In this matter, even assuming the presence of a substantial relationship between ATK and
the federal government, there is no impossibility of the federal government raising its own rights
under the Supremacy Clause3 and there is no dilution of the federal government's rights by
finding that ATK does not have standing to raise a claim on the federal government's behalf.

In all cases cited by ATK in support of its argument that the assessment of the privilege tax is a violation of the
Supremacy Clause, the United States is the party asserting its own rights under the Supremacy Clause. See e.g. U.S.
v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); U.S. v. Nve County, 178 F3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Nve County,
938 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991); U.S, v. Hawkins County. 859 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Colorado^ 627 F.2d
217 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Accordingly, the Court finds that ATK cannot establish the second and third requirements under
the Shelledv test
ATK argues that Evans & Sutherland Computer Corporation v. Utah State Tax
Commission allows the Court to hear constitutional issues raised by a party on behalf of a third
party when interpreting the constitutionality of a statute. 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997). hi Evans &
Sutherland Computer Corporation, however, the constitutional rights being asserted are those of
the defendant, not a third party, and thus, the case is inapplicable to this matter. Id. Accordingly,
the Court finds that ATK does not have standing to assert (hat the assessed privilege tax is a
violation of the Supremacy Clause on behalf of the federal government
Further, the Court notes that even assuming ATK has standing to assert their Supremacy
Clause argument, the privilege tax assessed against ATK would not be unconstitutional. ATK
argues that Salt Lake County assessed the privilege tax against both their beneficial use and
against the rights retained by the Navy. However, Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 provides that "a
tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person . . . . " Utah
Code Ann. § 59-4-101(l)(a) (emphasis added). The Court has already found that ATK had
"exclusive possession" of the NIROP Property. If ATK's possession of the NIROP Property was
exclusive, its beneficial use of the NIROP Property was the value of the NIROP Property and
there was no tax assessed against the Navy. See U.S. v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 741-42
(1982).
Additionally, and contrary to ATK's assertions, the privilege tax was apportioned
according to ATK's beneficial use. ATK exclusively possessed and/or beneficially used all but
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15 of the improvements on the NIROP Property.4 Salt Lake County did not assess a privilege tax
against the unused buildings as they were found to have no value. Accordingly, Salt Lake
County only assessed a privilege tax against ATK for the actual possession and the actual other
beneficial use ATK enjoyed on the NIROP Property.5
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, ATK's arguments in favor of summary judgment are without merit. Based
on the foregoing, the Court must DENY the Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and
GRANT the Respondents' motion for summary judgment. The Court directs Respondents to
prepare and submit an order that is consistent with and reflects this Ruling. Further, in
accordance with Rule 6-103(6) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Court shall
order this Ruling published.
Date signed:JIIJ^JLQ^L
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4

ATK may argue that there axe 16 improvements that were not used by ATK, i.e. as the Navy used one of the
buildings. However, the Navy's use of that building was for ATK's benefit to supervise ATK's operations and
maintain the NIROP Property. Accordingly, the Navy administration building was beneficially used, if not
exclusively possessed, by ATK.
5
The Court notes that ATK failed to argue that the privilege tax assessed is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, However, the Court believes that, for the
same reasons the tax would not violate the Supremacy Clause, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
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established a three-part test to determine when a party may assert the constitutional rights of a
third party: "First, the presence of some substantial relationship between the claimant and the
third parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders asserting their own constitutional
rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of third parties' constitutional rights that would
result were the assertion of jus tertii not permitted." Shelledy, 836 P.2d at 789. The Court finds
that ATK cannot establish the second and third requirements under the Shelledy test and
therefore does not have standing to raise the Supremacy Clause claim.
Even assuming ATK had standing to assert its Supremacy Clause argument, which it
does not, the privilege tax assessed against ATK is constitutional. ATK had "exclusive
possession" of the NIROP Property. Since ATK's possession was exclusive, its beneficial use of
the NIROP Property was the value of the NIROP Property and no tax was assessed against the
Navy.
DATED this *1

day of December, 2009.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,

FINAL ORDER ON APPLICATION
OF UTAH'S PRIVILEGE TAX

Petitioner,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION, UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION, and the GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT

Civil No. 030917933
2000 Tax Year

Tax Court Judge: JON M. MEMMOTT

Respondents.

The Court has reviewed the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, including the
moving and responding papers along with their supporting documentation and the Court's case
file. Oral argument was held 26 October 2009, where David J. Crapo appeared for Petitioner
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK"), Mary Ellen Sloan and Kelly W. Wright appeared for
Respondent Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("BOE"), and John C. McCarrey and Laron
J. Lind appeared for Respondent Utah State Tax Commission. After being fully advised in the
premises, the Court issued its Ruling on Petitioner's and Respondent BOE's Cross Motions for
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Summary Judgment and published the same on 12 November 2009. Consistent with the Court's
ruling, the reasons set forth therein, and with good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner ATK is subject to the privilege tax assessed
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 for tax year 2000. Respondent BOE's Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED and Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Court
adopts the factual assertions of the parties' pleadings contained in Respondent BOE's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Petitioner's Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment and concludes there are no material facts in dispute.1 Applying
Utah law to the undisputed facts, the Court further concludes that ATK was in exclusive
possession of the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant ("NIROP") as of 1 January 2000, as
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(e) through its permitted possession and use of
the premises under its Facilities Use, Capital Maintenance and Production Contracts and
subcontracts, even though the land-owner, the Navy, retained traditional levels of management
and control in the NIROP Property. No one else other than the land-owner (i.e., the Navy), had
any possession, use, management, or control of the NIROP Property during 2000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the tax imposed under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101
does not violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution creates rights for the federal government, not for private
individuals. Under Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court

1

When the BOE filed its opposition to ATK's Motion for Summary Judgment, it also filed a Motion to Strike
Portions of the Affidavit of Kim Abplanalp. Mr. Abplanalp is the Director of Business Operations for ATK's Space
Launch Systems and he had submitted an affidavit setting forth certain facts relied on by ATK in its Motion for
Summary Judgment. At the 26 October 2009 oral argument, the Court denied the BOE's Motion to Strike Portions
of the Affidavit of Kim Abplanalp.
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